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Abstract 
 
This article takes advantage of access to confidential matched bank-firm data relative to the Belgian 
economy to investigate whether and how employment decisions of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have been affected by credit constraints in the wake of the Great Recession. 
Variability in banks’ financial health following the Great Recession is used as an exogenous 
determinant of firms’ access to credit. Two-stage least squares and bivariate probit estimates 
suggest that SMEs borrowing money from pre-crisis less healthy banks were significantly more 
likely to be affected by a credit constraint and, in turn, to adjust their labour input downwards than 
pre-crisis clients of more healthy banks. More precisely, estimates show that credit-constrained 
SMEs were ceteris paribus between 40 and 65% more likely to reduce their workforce than their 
counterparts not facing such constraints. Yet, findings also indicate that employment consequences 
of credit shortages depend heavily on the environment in which SMEs operate. Results indeed 
indicate that credit constraints have been essentially detrimental for employment among SMEs 
experiencing a negative demand shock or facing severe product market competition. Finally, in 
terms of adjustment channels, results show that credit-constrained SMEs adjusted their workforce 
significantly more at the extensive margin (through individual layoffs, reduction of temporary 
employment and early retirement) than their non-constrained counterparts, but also that they relied 
more intensively on temporary layoff schemes (for economic reasons). 
 
JEL classification: C35, C36, D22, G01, G21, J21, J23. 
Key words: banks’ financial health, credit constraints, employment, Great Recession, matched 
bank-firm data, Belgium, Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) constitute the core of the European economy. In 
2013, they totalled more than 99% of all active European firms and employed roughly 70% of 
the overall labour force (Muller et al., 2014). Therefore, questions related to the performance 
of SMEs have attracted a large share of attention in debates concerning the post-2008 crisis 
and the consequent economic recovery. The focus has notably been on the challenges that 
SMEs face in terms of credit constraints and especially on how these constraints may 
potentially initiate consequences on broader economic outcomes. 
While a large literature documents how capital market imperfections affect real 
corporate decisions such as capital and R&D investments (Brown et al., 2009; Gerlach-
Kirsten et al., 2015; Love, 2003), studies regarding the employment consequences of credit 
constraints are much scarcer, particularly in the context of the Great Recession (Campello et 
al., 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Fabiani et al., 2015; Siemer, 
2014). Evidence on this issue is only available for a limited number of countries and many 
important questions regarding the nexus between credit shortages and employment still 
deserve to be investigated. The role of moderating factors (such as product demand and 
competition) in explaining the labour demand decisions of credit-constrained firms is notably 
quite under-researched. Also very little is known regarding the various strategies that might 
be implemented by firms to adjust employment when credit is lacking. On top of this, existing 
studies must often be considered with caution as adequately controlling for the endogeneity of 
credit  constraints  remains  challenging,  but  also  because  these  studies  do  not  always  rely  on  
direct information to identify whether firms are credit constrained or not. Finally, most studies 
focus on all firms independently of their size, though some studies suggest that employment 
effects of credit shortages are likely to be stronger among SMEs (Chodorow-Reich, 2014, 
Siemer, 2014). 
Our paper is one of the first to rely on detailed matched bank-firm data to investigate 
the employment consequences of credit constraints among SMEs in the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis. We combine data from the third wave of the Belgian Wage Dynamics Survey, covering 
the period 2010-2013, with confidential data from the Central Corporate Credit Register from 
the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  (NBB).  To  identify  a  causal  effect  of  credit  constraints  on  
employment, we adopt two-stage least squares (2SLS) and bivariate probit estimators. More 
precisely, we use the variability in banks’ financial health, following the Great Recession, as 
an exogenous determinant of firms’ access to credit. Our prior is that firms borrowing money 
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from pre-crisis less healthy banks had a higher likelihood to be affected by a credit constraint 
during the crisis, and as a consequence, had to reduce employment more substantially than 
clients of more healthy banks. 
Belgium is a particularly interesting case study. Indeed, while this country has been 
severely hit by the 2008 financial crisis (e.g. three of the country’s largest banks – Fortis, 
Dexia and KBC – were bailed out, sold off and/or nationalised), the drop in employment was 
of  relatively  limited  scope  compared  with  neighbouring  countries  such  as  France,  the  
Netherlands and also with the EU average (Cornille, 2015). Put differently, though business 
funding has been under considerable pressure (Piette and Zachary, 2015), employment has 
been fairly resilient. Hence, it deserves to be investigated whether credit constraints among 
SMEs have had any significant employment effects in this specific context. Moreover, since 
the preservation of employment in Belgium has been attributed to various flexibility 
mechanisms (such as temporary lay-off allowances1), focusing on the various channels by 
which credit-constrained SMEs may have had adjusted their labour input is of particular 
interest. 
Our data enable us to estimate and compare the employment effects of different types 
of credit constraints. More precisely, we test whether employment effects vary according to: i) 
the type of loan application that was denied (i.e. loans to finance working capital, investments 
and/or debt), and ii) whether firms faced ‘quantitative’ or ‘cost’ credit constraints (i.e. 
whether credit was not available or whether the conditions to borrow money were too 
onerous). We also add to the literature by examining the role of two moderating factors, 
namely demand shocks and product market competition. Theoretically, we expect 
employment consequences of credit constraints to be stronger among SMEs operating in 
strong competitive environments and/or hit by a negative demand shock. Finally, we 
investigate in greater depth the different strategies that might be implemented by credit-
constrained firms to adjust employment. We first distinguish between the adjustment of 
labour at the extensive and intensive margins. Next, we study the different channels that can 
be used by firms to procure these adjustments.  
                                                             
1 These are short-time working allowances, also known under the heading ‘chômage temporaire’ (i.e. ‘temporary 
unemployment’). “These allowances (…) provide a framework in which employers can adjust employees’ 
working time in response to a variety of external circumstances including economic reasons, with the state 
mitigating the impact on employee remuneration via the state unemployment benefit system. (…) Additional 
allowances that further cushion the pay of employees on short-time work feature in collective agreements at 
company and industry level.” (Hurley, 2010) Eligibility for these allowances, traditionally restricted to blue-
collar workers, has been extended to white-collars in the Law of 19 June 2009 as part of a series of anti-crisis 
measures. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A literature review is provided in 
the next section. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and estimation strategy. Descriptive 
statistics and econometric results are presented in sections 5 and 6. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
 
A large literature has been dedicated to identifying factors at the root of firms’, and in 
particular SMEs’, financial constraints (Beck et al., 2006, 2008; Fazzari, 1998). Factors put 
forward to explain differences in firms’ access to external financing include, among others, 
the ownership structure of the firm, its age, size and sectoral affiliation but also certain 
country-specific characteristics like the degree of development of the financial market 
(Angelini and Generale, 2008; Coluzzi et al., 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). 
Overall, this literature suggests that financial constraints are sizeable but quite heterogeneous 
across firms, industries and countries. Drawing on detailed survey data for the euro area in 
2009, Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) show for instance that age and ownership are the most 
important predictors of firms’ perceived financial obstacles in all investigated countries, while 
estimates for size and economic branches are found to be less robust. In contrast, using survey 
data collected by the World Bank between 1999 and 2000 for five major euro area countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain), Colussi et al. (2009) show that young and small 
firms are significantly more likely to be credit-constrained. They also find substantial 
differences across sectors within countries, with higher constraints in the manufacturing and 
construction industries than in the services sector. From a cross-country perspective, estimates 
of Ferrando and Ruggieri (2015), based on Amadeus accounting data for several EU countries 
(Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherland and Portugal) over the 
period 1995-2011, suggest that firms in Italy and Portugal are the most affected by financial 
constraints, while those in Germany and the Netherland are the most immune. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the economic consequences of financial 
constraints. Interest in this issue has become particularly critical since 2008. The Great 
Recession indeed increased the need to better understand how firm’s real decisions are 
affected by a financial crisis and the role of firms’ access to credit in boosting economic 
recovery. Given that the crisis sparked a huge increase in unemployment rates among many 
advanced economies, a few recent papers have focused on the extent to which firms’ credit 
constraints and employment policies have been interconnected during the Great Recession.  
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Empirical contributions examining the employment consequences of credit constraints 
with data from before the Great Recession include most notably Hernando and Martinez-
Carrascal (2008). Relying on balance sheet data relative to Spanish firms over the period 
1985-2001, their GMM-system estimates show that firms facing high financial pressure 
(assed through firms’ debt burden, indebtedness and profitability) have substantial lower 
employment growth rates. The authors control for the endogeneity of firms’ financial position 
using internal instruments (i.e. lagged values of explanatory variables in levels and first-
differences, respectively). Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) also examined the impact on 
employment of increases in firm-level financial pressure. Using accounts data for a sample of 
U.K. manufacturing companies over the period 1972-1986, they find that the ratio of interest 
payment to cash flow (i.e. financial pressure) has a large negative effect on employment. This 
effect is identified using as an instrument firms’ lagged debt burden interacted with the 
current shift in the yield on Treasury bills.2 Also  focusing  on  balance  sheet  data  from U.K.  
manufacturing companies, but for the 1994-2004 period, Spaliara (2009) finds that the 
capital-labour ratio is sensitive to firm-specific characteristics (i.e. cash flow, leverage, 
collateral and interest burden), especially in firms that are more likely to face a financing 
constraint. Accordingly, the authors conclude that U.K. authorities should help constrained 
firms  to  avoid  shortage  of  credit  (especially  during  bad  economic  times)  so  as  to  preserve  
jobs. This conclusion is drawn on the basis of a GMM first-differenced estimator. 
Endogeneity is thus controlled for using internal instruments (lagged levels of explanatory 
variables). 
The literature on credit constraints and corporate employment decisions in the wake of 
the Great Recession, i.e. using post-2008 data, is quite limited. Campello et al. (2010) 
surveyed 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe and Asia to assess 
whether or not their corporations were credit-constrained in 2008 and, in turn, to study if these 
financial constraints had any real corporate effects, notably on employment. Using a matching 
estimator approach, i.e. pairing-up constrained and unconstrained companies facing similar 
economic circumstances, they find that financially constrained firms planned to cut more 
employment relative to financially unconstrained firms during the crisis. Although quite 
appealing, their matching approach applied to survey data may not be completely ‘bullet-
proof’ to potential endogeneity issues. Indeed, ‘CFOs may by themselves not be able to 
                                                             
2 The use of lagged values of the debt burden aims to ensure that they are uncorrelated with current employment 
shocks. Moreover, exogenous shifts in interest rates (i.e. in the Treasury bill yield), instituted by government 
policy over the sample period, are expected to have a bigger impact, the greater the debt burden faced by the 
firm. 
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separate economic from financial effects when responding to a survey’ (Campello et al., 2010: 
471). Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) investigated the link between small business lending and 
unemployment during the Great Recession in the U.S.. Combining information from the 
Current Population Survey with firms’ financial data for 2007-2009, they find that workers in 
small firms were more likely to lose their jobs than their opposite numbers in large firms, but 
only if they were employed in more financially distressed industries. Identification of credit 
supply effects is achieved through the use of industry-level measures of external finance 
dependence. Siemer (2014) also suggests, on the basis of detailed firm-level panel data for 
2007-2009, that financial constraints in the U.S. were more detrimental to employment 
growth in smaller firms. As in Campello et al. (2010), his identification strategy relies on the 
comparison of estimates for sectors with high and low external finance dependence. The study 
of Fabiani et al. (2015), based on harmonised data for 9 European countries for 2007-2009, 
shows that permanent and temporary employees’ likelihood to be dismissed was significantly 
bigger among credit-constrained firms. However, endogeneity of credit constraints is not 
explicitly addressed in their analysis. 
Our paper is more closely related to the few existing studies employing matched bank-
firm  data  to  investigate  how  shocks  to  bank  balance  sheets  affected  firms’  employment  
decisions during the Great Recession. The latter notably include the study of Chodorow-Reich 
(2014) for the U.S.. The author shows that credit-constrained SMEs were significantly more 
likely to reduce employment than their non-credit-constrained counterparts. In contrast, they 
find no significant effect of credit constraints on employment among larger firms. Firm credit 
constraints are instrumented by lenders’ financial health, i.e. the change in the loan supply to 
each of their borrowers before and after the Great Recession. The analysis of Popov and 
Rocholl (2015), based on detailed German data, shows that employment decline has been 
significantly stronger among firms (especially smaller ones) that have been hit by a credit 
constraint. Their instrument for firm credit constraints is a dummy indicating whether or not 
the firm had a credit relationship with a bank affected by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. 
Gerlach-Kristen et al. (2015) also find a negative and significant effect of credit constraints on 
the employment level of SMEs in the Irish economy. Their instrumental variables for credit 
constraints include: i) two binary indicators for the ownership of the bank, and ii) a dummy 
taking the value one if the firm believed – on the basis of factors not related to her own 
experience – such as media reports, lobby groups or business peers – that banks were not 
lending. 
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In sum, studies investigating the employment consequences of the ‘sharpest credit 
shortage in nearly a century’ (Campello et al., 2010: 486) are scarce and focused on a limited 
number of countries. Moreover, they leave the door open for further developments. Besides 
the fact that adequately controlling for the endogeneity of credit constraints remains 
challenging, a first important avenue for research but also for policy boils down to get a better 
understanding of moderating factors, and especially of how the nexus between credit shortage 
and employment is affected by product market demand and competition. Another under-
researched issue refers to the channels through which credit-constrained firms might adjust 
their labour input, e.g. at the extensive or intensive margin. This is an important question for 
policymakers as adjustment at the intensive margin (e.g. through the various short-time and 
temporary layoff schemes that have been made available to firms in many advanced 
economies during the crisis) contributes to mitigate job destruction. The objective of this 
paper is to improve our comprehension of these key issues taking advantage of access to 
detailed matched bank-firm data, for a representative sample of SMEs in Belgium, which: i) 
include direct information on several types of credit constraints and employment adjustment 
strategies, alongside various covariates for workforce composition, firm characteristics and 
other  aspects  of  the  economic  environment,  and  ii)  enable  us  to  instrument  firms’  access  to  
credit by the variability in banks’ financial health following the Great Recession. 
 
3. Data 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a Belgian firm-level survey undertaken within the Wage 
Dynamics Network (WDN) of the ESCB (i.e.  the European System of Central  Banks).  This 
survey (i.e. the so-called 3rd wave of the Belgian WDN survey) has been conducted by the 
National Bank of Belgium (NBB) in June and September 2014. It includes questions on firms’ 
perception of the nature of the changes in the economic environment that have resulted from 
the sovereign debt crisis, their reactions to these changes and the role of financial constraints.3 
More precisely, it broaches the changes that occurred in the economic environment during the 
course of the 2010-2013 period, by identifying the type and intensity of the shocks that might 
have affected companies. It also provides detailed information on the structure and adaptation 
of labour forces in the companies questioned. 
                                                             
3 A copy of the questionnaire can be found on the NBB’s website (see www.nbb.be/en/wage-dynamics-network-
wdn-3). 
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The survey covers firms employing at least 5 workers and less than 250 workers in the 
manufacturing and building industries, trade, business services and the financial sector.4 The 
sectors covered by the survey together account for 52% of employment in Belgian firms 
(excluding self-employed). The survey was sent out by surface mail, with the option of using 
an electronic format version. In total, 991 firms participated in the survey, giving a response 
rate of 21%. Given the length of the questionnaire, this can be considered as satisfactory. 
While the participating firms make up 1.7% of the total number of firms, they account for 
5.4% of total employment. Unfortunately, the response rate for the energy sector was zero, 
while it was relatively high for the financial sector. However, interpretations of the results for 
the financial sector have to take into account the low number of participating firms.5 In terms 
of response behaviour by questions, the response rate is on average higher than 95% and 
varies between 100% and 83%. The answers are consistent with information from other 
sources (Cornille, 2015). 
The  survey  results  have  to  be  weighted  in  order  to  make  them  representative  of  the  
underlying population of firms. To this end, the population has been sub-divided in strata 
according to sector of activity and number of workers. The weighting coefficients correspond 
to the ratio of the population of firms within each stratum and the number of firms that replied 
to the survey questionnaire in each stratum. Descriptive statistics and econometric results 
presented in this paper are weighted in this way. Around 140 firms had to be left out due to 
missing replies. Our final sample thus includes circa 850 firms.6 Overall, it is representative of 
private-sector firms employing between 5 and 250 workers, with the exception of the energy 
sector. 
To  identify  a  causal  effect  of  credit  constraints  on  employment,  endogeneity  (i.e.  
reverse causality) issues have to be addressed. Therefore, we rely on two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) and bivariate probit models. Following existing research (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; 
Clarke et al., 2006; Gerlach-Kirsten et al., 2015), our instruments are mainly drawn from the 
characteristics of the firms’ main bank (see next section for more details). This information is 
not available in the WDN survey. Therefore, the latter has been merged with data from the 
Central Corporate Credit Register (CCCR) from the NBB. This merger reduces the number of 
firms in our sample by 36%, i.e. from 850 to around 540 firms. This drop in sample size 
                                                             
4 Although the sample design did not contain an explicit upper threshold for firm size, in practice almost 99% of 
firms that were surveyed employed less than 250 workers. Given our focus on SMEs, firms employing 250 
workers or more have been dropped. 
5 For more details on the sample design and its representativeness see Cornille (2015). 
6 The exact number of firms varies slightly across regressions as the number of observations with missing replies 
depends on the type of credit constraint under investigation and on the instrument set. 
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derives from the fact that a certain number of firms have no bank credit at all, have only bank 
credits outside Belgium, or are part of bigger corporations which have their own bank credits. 
The magnitude of the attrition is coherent with more aggregate evidence from credit register 
data and the distribution of firm size in our sample (Piette and Zachary, 2015). The impact of 
attrition on the composition of our sample and hence on its representativeness is very limited. 
Indeed, as discussed below, descriptive statistics remain remarkably stable after sample 
reduction. 
 
4. Estimation strategy 
 
4.1. Baseline specification 
 
Our empirical investigation is made of two steps. First, we test the employment consequences 
of credit constraints with a linear probability model (LPM). More precisely, we estimate by 
ordinary least squares (OLS), the following firm-level equation: 
 
iiii XCCEmployment HOED             (1) 
 
The dependent variable in equation (1) is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm i needed to 
significantly reduce its labour input or to alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 
otherwise. The main explanatory variable CCi is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the 
firm has been affected by a credit constraint between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. The 
WDN survey contains different questions to identify credit constraints. Hence, we considered 
two definitions of credit constraints, namely whether a firm experienced: a) a decrease in 
access to external financing through the usual financial channels (Decreased accessi), and b) a 
quantitative credit constraint, i.e. the firm replied that credit of any type was unavailable 
(Quantitative constrainti). 
Firm-level covariates are contained in the vector Xi. In selecting these covariates, we 
draw on existing research which suggests to control for workforce composition, firm 
characteristics and other aspects of the economic environment (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; 
Gerlach-Kirsten et al., 2015; Siemer, 2014).7 Accordingly, Xi includes the share of the 
workforce within firm i that has at most 5 years of tenure; the proportion of high-skilled 
                                                             
7 Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we cannot control for firm time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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workers among both blue- and white collars (i.e. ISCO codes 1-3 and 7-8); the sectoral 
affiliation  (4  dummies),  age  (in  years)  and  size  (i.e.  the  total  number  of  employees)  of  the  
firm;  a  dummy taking  the  value  1  if  the  degree  of  competition  on  the  market  for  the  firm’s  
main product/service is severe or very severe, and 0 otherwise (i.e. if it is moderate or weak); 
and a binary variable taking the value 1 if the level of demand for the firm’s products/services 
has been decreasing moderately or strongly during 2010-2013, and 0 otherwise (i.e. if it 
remained unchanged or increased).  
OLS estimates of qualitative response models, such as equation (1), are generally 
considered to be reliable when predicted probabilities are close to 0.5 (Wooldridge, 2002). 
This is because the underlying conditional expectation function (CEF) is roughly linear in the 
middle. Moreover, numerous arguments are provided in the literature for preferring the LPM 
to logit/probit models, e.g. presence of a weighting scheme (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), ease 
of interpretation (McGarry, 2000) and perfect multicollinearity associated to probit estimates 
in specific contexts (Reiley, 2005). Nevertheless, the main shortcoming of LPM estimates is 
that they are not bounded to the unit interval. More precisely, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) 
demonstrate that the potential bias associated to the LPM is proportional to the share of LPM 
predicted probabilities that fall outside the unit interval.8 Hence,  to  check  the  robustness  of  
our results, we systematically examine the concordance of LPM estimates with marginal 
effects from a probit model. 
 
4.2. Instrumental variables and exclusion restrictions 
 
When studying the employment consequences of credit constraints, an important econometric 
issue that has to be addressed is endogeneity (i.e. reverse causality). The argument is that 
firms  might  reduce  their  labour  input  because  they  faced  a  credit  constraint.  Yet,  it  is  also  
possible that firms don’t get the required funding because they have financial difficulties, 
which  led  them  to  lay  off  workers.  Hence,  the  second  step  of  our  estimation  strategy  boils  
down to address this potential  endogeneity issue.  To do so,  we first  rely on two-stage least-
squares (2SLS). This method consists in finding instrumental variables (IV), which are at the 
same time highly correlated with the endogenous variable (i.e. credit constraints) and 
uncorrelated with firm-level changes in employment. We use as instruments for credit 
                                                             
8 However, according to Wooldridge (2002: 455): “If the main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of [the 
independent variable] on the response probability, averaged across the distribution of [the independent variable], 
then the fact that some predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important”. 
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constraints various characteristics of firms’ main banks. More precisely, to measure credit 
availability to firm i, we first rely on the % change in the number of loans made by the firm’s 
i main bank to all borrowers other than firm i before (i.e. October 2005 – June 2007) and after 
(i.e. October 2008 – June 2011) the crisis.9 This  variable  reflects  the  financial  health  of  the  
firm’s main bank. The bigger, i.e. the more positive, the value of this variable, the healthier 
the lender is expected to be. As in Chodorow-Reich (2014), we thus use the variability in 
lender’s  health  as  an  exogenous  determinant  of  the  firm’s  access  to  credit.  Our  prior  is  that  
firms borrowing money from pre-crisis less healthy lenders had a higher likelihood to be 
affected by a credit constraint during the crisis, and as a consequence, had to reduce their 
labour input more substantially than clients of more healthy banks. 
To address endogeneity, we also use as IV (in some specifications) a binary variable 
indicating  whether  the  firm’s  main  bank  is  of  foreign  origin,  i.e.  either  a  branch  or  a  
subsidiary of a foreign bank. The literature suggests that foreign-owned lenders may apply 
different allocation criteria than domestic ones (Clarke et al., 2006; Gerlach-Kristen et al., 
2015; Ongena and Sendeniz-Yüncü, 2011). Although the empirical evidence is still unsettled, 
some papers (e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Gianetti and Ongena, 2012) for instance 
suggest that foreign-owned banks are less likely to grant loans to soft information borrowers 
(i.e. borrowers that are more difficult to observe and to monitor), such as smaller enterprises. 
Moreover, banks of foreign origin all rely, at least partially, on funding from their parent. 
Hence, their decision to grant loans to domestic firms will be influenced by the financial 
health of the holding to which they belong. Overall, this implies that firms borrowing money 
from foreign-owned banks before the crisis may have had a credit constraint between 2010 
and 2013 not because of their own economic situation, but due to the financial distress of the 
parent bank. To strengthen our IV strategy, aiming to capture the variability in lenders’ health, 
we also adopt in some regressions a more direct approach by including dummies identifying 
the main bank of each firm. In a few specifications, we furthermore control for the number of 
banks to which firms have been borrowing money during the 2010-2013 period. The intuition 
is that firms with a more diversified panel of lenders may have had ceteris paribus easier 
access to credit because not all banks had the same financial difficulties and hence the same 
tight lending criteria during the crisis.  
In addition to these bank characteristics, we use as IV the risk of default of each firm 
as evaluated by its main bank (in 2012 and/or 2013). The rationale for including this variable 
                                                             
9 To take bank size into account, as in Chodorow-Reich (2014), this % change is normalised by the number of 
loans made by the firm’s main bank before the crisis. 
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among IVs is that many firms with a somewhat higher, but not excessive, risk of default had 
more  difficulties  to  borrow  money  (as  most  banks  reduced  their  loans  and  gave  priority  to  
their  best  clients  during  the  crisis)  even  though  the  financial  situation  of  those  firms  didn’t  
require them to adjust their labour input. Finally, in a few specifications, we also include a 
dummy indicating whether the firm is composed of different establishments. Our prior is that, 
at given firm size, multi-establishment firms might be less credit constrained than their mono-
establishment counterparts because having different sites of production/sales is likely to 
reduce the overall financial risk. However, it could also be argued that multi-establishment 
firms have more complex financial accounts, which in turn will make their credit risk, as 
perceived by lenders, higher. 
Various diagnoses tests are performed when running 2SLS regressions. The latter 
explore respectively the acuteness of the endogeneity issue in our data and the quality of our 
instruments. More precisely, we first compute the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for weak 
identification. It is a Wald F statistic testing whether the excluded instruments are sufficiently 
correlated with the endogenous regressor. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
weak. We rely on the standard ‘rule of thumb’ that weak identification is problematic for F-
statistics smaller than 10 (as suggested by van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2011). Next, we examine 
the validity of our instruments with Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions. Under 
the null hypothesis the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. Finally, we 
compute an endogeneity test with the null hypothesis that the credit constraint can actually be 
considered as exogenous. The test is based on the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: 
one for the equation in which the credit constraint is treated as endogenous, and one in which 
it is treated as exogenous. If the null hypothesis of this test cannot be rejected, then 
instrumentation is actually not necessary. In order to be as parsimonious as possible, we limit 
the number of IVs in the first step of our 2SLS regressions. More precisely, we report 2SLS 
estimates that: i) pass both the weak instruments and over-identification tests, and ii) include 
the smallest number of instruments. 
The traditional approach to control for endogeneity is the 2SLS estimation. However, 
since both the dependent variable and the potentially endogenous variable are binary the use 
of  2SLS  might  be  criticized.  Therefore,  we  also  use  a  bivariate  probit  model  to  check  the  
robustness of our results. The relevance of the bivariate model compared to the single probit 
model is verified with a Wald test examining whether the correlation of the error terms of the 
two probit regressions is significantly different from zero. If the test rejects the null 
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hypothesis of no correlation between the two error terms, the bivariate probit is 
recommended. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
To  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  effect  of  credit  constraints  on  the  adjustment  of  
employment within firms, a series of sensitivity tests are performed. 
 Our benchmark specification, i.e. equation (1), focusses principally on the 
employment  effects  of  quantitative  credit  constraints,  i.e.  whether  credit  was  available  to  a  
firm or not. Yet, the WDN survey also contains information on cost constraints, i.e. whether 
credit was available but the conditions (interest rates and other contractual terms) were too 
onerous (Cost constrainti).  A  first  sensitivity  test  thus  aims  to  examine  if  the  employment  
consequences of quantitative and cost constraints are comparable in terms of magnitude and 
significance. 
The literature suggests a number of channels through which credit constraints may 
affect the employment decisions of firms (Campello, 2003; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; 
Spaliara, 2009). A first channel is credit availability to finance working capital. As working 
capital loans are meant to finance everyday expenses related to the daily operation of a 
business (e.g. to cover unexpected costs, pay employee wages), they are very likely to have a 
direct impact on the firm’s employment decisions. Another channel is credit to finance 
investments. If a company cannot borrow as much as she wants to invest in capital goods, she 
is  likely  to  recruit  less  workers  to  complement  the  new  fixed  asset.  This  is  the  expected  
outcome if one assumes that capital and labour are complementary inputs, i.e. that the capital-
labour ratio remains relatively stable. For higher degrees of substitutability between labour 
and capital, the outcome may be different. Indeed, the firm could than choose to decrease its 
capital-labour ratio by hiring more workers than initially planned as a compensation strategy. 
A third channel is credit availability to refinance debt. Firms willing to refinance their debt 
may want to take advantage of a better interest rate (reduced monthly payment or term) or to 
reduce/alter the risk relative to their debt (e.g. by switching from a variable-rate to a fixed-rate 
loan). However, it may also be a strategy for financial distressed borrowers to restructure their 
debt, i.e. to free up cash (e.g. by negotiating lower monthly payments for a longer term). Most 
firms that are denied credit to refinance their debt are probably in the second situation. Hence, 
the  employment  consequences  of  this  type  of  credit  constraint  are  likely  to  be  negative.  To  
sum  up,  our  second  sensitivity  test  aims  to  examine  how  these  different  channels  of  credit  
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constraints affect firms’ employment responses. To do so, we break down WDN data on 
financial constraints by type of loan application made, focusing on applications for working 
capital, new investments and debt refinancing. 
Next, we investigate two potentially important moderators. On the one hand, we 
examine the role of demand shocks. More precisely, we test whether firms experiencing credit 
constraints had to adjust employment more substantially when they were hit concomitantly by 
a negative demand shock. To do so, we re-estimate equation (1) separately for: i) firms 
reporting a moderate or strong decrease in the demand for their main product/service, and ii) 
those whose demand remained unchanged or increased between 2010 and 2013. Clearly, we 
expect employment consequences of credit constraints to be stronger among the former group 
of firms. On the other hand, we test the moderating role of firms’ product environment. To do 
so, we re-estimate equation (1) separately for: i) firms facing severe or very severe 
competition on their main product/service market, and ii) those facing moderate or weak 
competition. Traditional bargaining models, e.g. ‘right-to-manage’ or ‘efficient bargaining’ 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2014), suggest that employment adjustment should increase with the 
elasticity of labour demand and the price elasticity of demand in the product market. 
Accordingly, we expect employment responses to be stronger among firm operating in more 
competitive markets. 10 
Finally, we investigate in greater depth the different strategies that can be implemented 
by firms to adjust employment following a credit constraint. We first distinguish between the 
adjustment of labour at the extensive and intensive margins. Next, we study the different 
channels that can be used by firms to procure these adjustments. For the extensive margin, we 
focus in turn on: collective layoffs, individual layoffs, adjustment of temporary employment 
and early retirement. As regards the intensive margin, we examine respectively temporary 
layoffs (for economic reasons) and reductions of working hours (subsidised or not). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 Theoretically, wage responses to credit constraints are also expected to be stronger in more competitive 
markets. Although this issue is beyond the scope of our paper, descriptive statistics from the WDN survey show 
that between 2010 and 2013 (a period characterised by near-zero inflation) only 0.6% (1.6%) of firms cut basic 
wages (flexible wage components), while 33% of firms reduced their labour input. Overall, this suggests that if 
credit constraints have had any impact on the labour force in Belgium, it should be in terms of quantity rather 
than in terms of prices. This conclusion is not surprising in light of earlier findings showing the prevalence of 
strong real downward wage rigidity in Belgium (Babecky et al., 2010; du Caju et al., 2012). 
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5. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all variables included in our econometric analysis. 
Results show that 33% of firms in our sample reduced their labour input or had to alter its 
composition between 2010 and 2013. 31% of firms declared they adjusted labour at the 
extensive margin, while 21% did so at the intensive margin. As regards channels to adjust 
labour at the extensive margin, 28% of firms reported that they relied on individual layoffs 
and 17% on temporary employment adjustment. Collective layoffs and early retirement 
schemes have been used by a much smaller proportion of firms (respectively, 1 and 8%). To 
adjust labour at the intensive margin, firms heavily relied on temporary layoffs (17%). In 
contrast, only 8% of firms decided to reduce working hours. 
About credit constraints, 25% of firms declared that they experienced a moderate or 
strong decrease in access to external financing between 2010 and 2013, 27% replied that they 
faced a quantitative constraint (i.e. credit was not available) and 23% a cost constraint (i.e. 
credit was available but the conditions – interest rate and other contractual terms – were too 
onerous). In addition, around 15% of firms responded they were denied credit to finance 
working capital or to refinance their debt, while around 20% could not borrow money to make 
a new investment. Concerning workforce characteristics, results indicate that firms in our 
sample  have  on  average  37%  of  workers  with  at  most  5  years  of  tenure  and  43%  of  high-
skilled workers (among both white and blue collars). On average, firms employ 35 workers 
and have been established around 36 years ago. The sectoral distribution of firms is as 
follows: business activities (37%), trade (29%), manufacturing (16%), construction (14%) and 
financial intermediation (3%). Regarding other aspects of the economic environment, 
statistics indicate that 52% of firms experienced a moderate or strong decrease in the demand 
for their products/services between 2010 and 2013, while 81% faced severe or very severe 
competition on their main product/service market. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
To address potential endogeneity, the WDN survey has been merged with data from 
the CCCR. As highlighted in section 3, this merger reduces the number of firms from 850 to 
around 540.  The  impact  of  this  attrition  on  the  composition  of  our  sample  and  hence  on  its  
representativeness is very limited. Indeed, most descriptive statistics reported in Appendix 1 
remain remarkably stable. This said, a few differences can be highlighted. First, we find that 
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firms are slightly smaller in the merged sample (the average number of employees decreases 
from 35  to  around 30).  Second,  the  share  of  firms  that  have  experienced  a  credit  constraint  
becomes somewhat bigger (notably when focussing on the quantitative constraint’s variable 
which increases from 27 to 33%). Finally, the share of firms operating in the financial 
intermediation  sector  drops  from  3  to  0%.11 Overall, our sample is representative of firms 
employing between 5 and 250 workers in the manufacturing and building industries, trade and 
business services.12 
 
6. Regression analysis 
 
6.1. Benchmark estimates  
 
OLS estimates of equation (1) are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. They show that 
credit constraints have had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of firms to reduce 
their labour input between 2010 and 2013.13 The regression coefficients associated to credit  
constraints stand respectively at 0.083 and 0.099. This implies that firms facing credit 
constraints were ceteris paribus between 8 and 10 percent more likely to adjust their 
workforce  downwards  than  their  opposite  numbers  not  facing  such  constraints.  As  a  
robustness test, we computed marginal effects from probit regressions. The latter, reported in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, lead to the same conclusion. The magnitude and significance 
of employment effects are indeed very similar when applying OLS or probit estimators. 
Regression coefficients associated to covariates are also generally found to be significant. As 
anticipated, they notably show that firms experiencing a decrease in the demand for their 
product or facing strong competition on their market were more likely to reduce their labour 
force. Moreover, while the probability to adjust labour downwards appears to be significantly 
bigger among firms employing a larger share of workers with less than 5 years of tenure, the 
opposite outcome is observed (in the probit regression) for firms with more high-skilled 
workers. These results are compatible with the idea that firms can more easily lay off workers 
when adjustment costs are lower, i.e. when workers’ tenure and/or skills are more limited. 
                                                             
11 Descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables (excluding restrictions) used in the 2SLS (bivariate probit) 
regressions are reported in Appendix 2. 
12 The energy and financial intermediation sectors are not covered. 
13 The dependent variable in Table 2 is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or to alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. 
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 Yet, these estimates should be taken with caution as endogeneity (i.e. reverse 
causality) could be an issue. Put differently, estimates might be biased because the 
relationship between employment adjustment and credit constraints could go in both 
directions. To address this potential issue, we first re-estimated equation (1) with 2SLS using 
as instruments proxies of banks’ financial health in addition to selected firm characteristics 
(see  section  4.2).  Results  are  reported  in  columns  (1)  and  (2)  of  Table  3.  The  p-values 
associated to the endogeneity test are equal to 0.03 and 0.09, respectively. This suggests that 
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity can be rejected at traditional probability levels, i.e. 
2SLS estimates should be preferred to those obtained by OLS. Furthermore, we find that the 
test statistic for weak identification is always bigger than 10, which implies that our 
instruments are not weak. This is also illustrated by our first stage regressions. Estimates, 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Appendix 3, indeed show that most instruments are 
significant with the expected sign. For instance, we find that the percentage change in the loan 
supply  of  the  main  bank  of  a  firm  (before  and  after  the  crisis)14 decreases significantly the 
probability  of  that  firm to  be  effected  by  a  credit  constraint.  Put  differently,  results  indicate  
that firms borrowing money from more healthy lenders before the Great Recession (i.e. banks 
whose  loan  supply  was  least  affected  by  the  crisis)  had  a  lower  likelihood  to  be  credit  
constrained after the crisis. We also find that many bank dummies are statistically significant 
in column (2). This again suggests that firms’ difficulties to borrow money were at least partly 
driven by the severity of the financial distress of their main bank. Lastly, estimates confirm 
that access to credit was tighter among firms whose risk of default (as evaluated by their main 
bank) was higher. Concerning the quality of our instruments, we further find that the p-value 
associated to the Hansen’s J overidentification  test  (see  columns  (1)  and  (2)  of  Table  3)  is  
equal to 0.50 and 0.34, respectively. This implies that our instruments are valid, i.e. we cannot 
reject the exogeneity of the latter. 
As regards 2SLS regression coefficients, they again show that credit constraints have 
had a highly significant and positive effect on the probability that firms adjusted their labour 
input downwards between 2010 and 2013. More precisely, they indicate that firms facing 
credit constraints were ceteris paribus between 41 and 68 percent more likely to reduce their 
labour input. These estimates are much bigger than those obtained by OLS and probit. 
Accordingly, it appears that causal employment effects of credit constraints are substantially 
                                                             
14 As noted in section 4.2.,  the exact definition of this variable is as follows: % change in the number of loans 
made by the firm’s i main bank to all  borrowers other than firm i before (i.e. October 2005 – June 2007) and 
after (i.e. October 2008 – June 2011) the crisis, normalized by the number of loans made by the firm’s i main 
bank before the crisis. 
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under-estimated when endogeneity is not controlled for. A similar finding is reported by 
Chodorow-Reich (2014: 41) using U.S. data. 
As a robustness test, we computed marginal effects from bivariate probit regressions 
using the same covariates and excluding restrictions (i.e. instruments) as in our 2SLS 
specifications. Results, reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, first show that bivariate 
probit estimates should be preferred to simple probit ones. Wald test statistics are indeed 
highly significant (p-values equal to 0.00) both in columns (3) and (4). Furthermore, estimates 
confirm  the  positive  and  significant  effect  of  credit  constraints  on  employment  adjustment.  
Marginal effects from our bivariate probit regressions are respectively equal to 0.41 and 0.37, 
which is relatively close to our 2SLS estimates. 
In sum, our regression analysis clearly highlights that credit matters. We find indeed 
that firms borrowing money from pre-crisis less healthy banks were more likely to be affected 
by a credit constraint and, in turn, to adjust their labour input downwards than pre-crisis 
clients of more healthy lenders.  
 
6.2. Sensitivity tests 
 
In this section, we test the sensitivity of our findings by: i) examining the employment effects 
of cost rather than quantitative credit constraints, ii) differentiating quantitative constraints by 
type of loan application that has been denied, iii) investigating the moderating role of demand 
shocks and product market competition, and iv) exploring the different strategies that have 
been implemented by credit-constrained firms to adjust employment (see discussion in section 
4.3). 
 Results in Table 4 show OLS, 2SLS, probit and bivariate probit estimates relative to 
cost credit constraints, namely a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm declared that 
credit was available between 2010 and 2013 but that the conditions (interest rates and other 
contractual terms) were too onerous, and zero otherwise. Independently of the estimator 
adopted, regression coefficients associated to this variable are always found to be insignificant 
at standard probability levels. This outcome suggests that firms that had to cope with more 
stringent credit conditions (i.e. to face cost credit constraints) were still able to borrow enough 
money,  at  sufficiently  good  terms  and  conditions,  so  as  to  keep  employment  unaffected.  It  
thus  appears  that  cost  constraints  have  had  a  much  less  detrimental  impact  on  employment  
than quantitative constraints. 
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Regressions examining the employment effects of quantitative credit constraints 
according to the type of loan application that was denied (i.e. loans to finance working capital, 
new investments and debt, respectively) are reported in Table 5. OLS estimates (which, 
according to the endogeneity test, should be preferred to 2SLS results) indicate that firms that 
have had a credit constraint were, depending on the type of denied credit, between 8 and 13 
percent more likely to adjust their workforce downwards than their opposite numbers not 
affected by such constraint. Similar results are obtained with a discrete choice model (see 
columns (1’’) to (3’’) of Table 5). Yet, the magnitude of estimates is much larger in this case. 
Bivariate probit estimates (which, according to Wald F² statistics, should be preferred to 
simple probit ones) indeed vary between 0.387 and 0.441.15 As  regards  the  relative  size  of  
employment effects, it appears to be quite similar across types of loan applications. Yet, 
regression coefficients are found to be significantly, though modestly, bigger (according to 
the bivariate probit estimator) for credit shortages associated to debt refinancing instead of 
working capital and new investments. 
In order to test the role of demand shocks in explaining employment effects of credit 
constraints, we re-estimated equation (1) according to whether or not firms reported a 
decrease in the demand for their products/services between 2010 and 2013. OLS and 2SLS 
results, reported in Table 6, reveal that credit constraints are only statistically significant 
among firms that experienced a negative demand shock. More precisely, we find that credit 
constrained firms, affected by a decrease in their demand, were ceteris paribus between 63 
and 80 percent more likely to adjust their labour input downwards. On the opposite, estimates 
show that credit constraints had no significant employment effects among firms with a stable 
or increasing demand. Results based on probit and bivariate probit regressions, reported in 
Appendix 4, deliver the same message. Hence, we may conclude that access to credit is 
mostly important for employment when demand is falling. 
Moreover, to examine the role of firms’ product environment, we re-estimated 
equation (1) according to whether or not firms were facing strong competition on their main 
product/service market between 2010 and 2013. Estimates, shown in Table 7 and Appendix 5, 
clearly indicate that credit constraints had a substantially stronger impact on employment 
among firms operating in strongly competitive markets. We find indeed that credit-
constrained firms were ceteris paribus between 43 and 78 percent more likely to reduce their 
labour input than not credit-constrained ones when operating in strongly competitive markets. 
                                                             
15 Note  that  bivariate  probit  estimates  are  probably  more  reliable  than  those  obtained  by  OLS  and  2SLS  as  
predicted probabilities are in this case less close to 0.5 (see discussion in section 4). 
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In contrast, credit constraints are found to have a non-significant effect on employment 
among firms operating in weakly competitive markets. In line with theoretical expectations, 
our findings thus suggest that credit constraints matter for employment especially among 
firms facing strong product market competition. 
Finally, we explored the different strategies that have been implemented by credit-
constrained firms to adjust employment. To do so, we first re-estimated equation (1) using as 
outcome variable employment adjustment along the extensive and intensive margins, 
respectively. When focusing on the extensive margin, the dependent variable is a dummy 
taking the value 1 for firms that relied (marginally, moderately or strongly) on i) collective 
layoffs, ii) individual layoffs, iii) non-renewal of temporary contracts at expiration and/or 
reduction of agency work, and/or iv) early retirement schemes between 2010 and 2013; and 0 
otherwise. When exploring employment adjustment along the intensive margin, the dependent 
variable is a dummy taking the value 1 for firms that relied (marginally, moderately or 
strongly) on i) temporary layoffs (for economic reasons), and/or ii) subsidised and/or non-
subsidised reduction of working hours (including reduction of overtime) between 2010 and 
2013; and 0 otherwise. To get a better understanding of credit-constrained firms’ strategies to 
reduce their labour input, equation (1) has also been re-estimated using as outcome variable 
each of these (extensive and intensive) adjustment channels separately. 
Estimates regarding employment adjustment at the extensive margin are reported in 
Table 8. 2SLS estimates and marginal effects from bivariate probit regressions (which, 
according to the endogeneity and Wald tests should be preferred to OLS and probit estimates) 
indicate that credit-constrained firms were ceteris paribus between 37 and 61 percent more 
likely to adjust employment at the extensive margin than non-constrained firms. Among the 
various  channels  that  can  be  used  to  attain  this  goal,  results  reported  in  Table  9  show  that  
credit-constrained firms essentially relied on individual layoffs, early retirement schemes and 
reduction of temporary employment. In contrast, we find no significant effect of credit 
constraints on collective layoffs.16 
Table 10 reports the impact of credit constraints on employment adjustment along the 
intensive  margin.  Estimates  are  generally  found  to  be  highly  significant.  However,  their  
magnitude is on average lower than in the extensive margin regressions. Indeed, coefficients 
fluctuate around 0.30 depending on the estimator and credit constraint variable under 
                                                             
16 Similar results (available on request) are obtained with probit and bivariate probit estimators. 
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investigation.17 Results in Table 11 provide more details on the policies that have been 
implemented by credit-constrained firms to adjust employment at the extensive margin. They 
show that the latter were significantly more likely to rely on temporary layoffs (for economic 
reasons) than their non-constrained opposite numbers. In contrast, firms’ likelihood to reduce 
working hours appears unrelated to whether or not they had a credit constraint. 
7. Conclusion
While the outbreak of the Great Recession caused much economic hardship, it also provided a 
unique opportunity to gain a better understanding of how corporate employment decisions are 
affected by credit shortages in bad economic times. Almost a decade after the onset of the 
crisis, evidence on this important issue remains surprisingly limited. This paper takes 
advantage of access to detailed matched bank-firm data to investigate whether and how 
employment decisions of SMEs have been affected by credit constraints in the wake of the 
Great Recession. To do so, we combined rich data from the third wave of the Belgian Wage 
Dynamics Survey, covering the period 2010-2013, with confidential data from the Central 
Corporate Credit Register from the National Bank of Belgium. 
Our regression analysis clearly shows that credit matters. Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) and bivariate probit estimates indeed suggest that SMEs borrowing money from pre-
crisis financially less healthy banks were significantly more likely to be affected by a credit 
constraint and, in turn, to adjust their labour input downwards than pre-crisis clients of more 
healthy banks. More precisely, we find that credit-constrained SMEs were ceteris paribus 
between 40 and 65% more likely to reduce their workforce than their opposite numbers not 
facing such constraints. This result is robust across types of loan applications that were denied 
credit (i.e. applications to finance working capital, debt or new investments). 
Yet, estimates also show that employment consequences of credit shortages are 
contingent on the environment in which firms operate. Results indeed indicate that credit 
constraints have been essentially detrimental for employment among SMEs experiencing a 
negative demand shock or facing severe product market competition. This outcome is in line 
17 Endogeneity and Wald test statistics suggest that 2SLS and bivariate probit estimates should be preferred, 
except when examining the impact of ‘Decreased access’ with a linear model (see columns (1) and (1’) of Table 
10). In this case, the endogeneity test is not significant which implies that the focus should be on OLS estimates. 
However, as highlighted in footnote 15, estimates based on qualitative response models (reported in columns (2), 
(2’), (4) and (4’)) are probably more reliable in this case. 
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with traditional bargaining models predicting that employment adjustment increases with the 
elasticity of labour demand and the price elasticity of demand in the product market.  
Finally, our estimates uncover the strategies that have been adopted by credit-
constrained firms to adjust their labour input. Despite the fact that aggregate employment has 
been fairly resilient in Belgium following the 2008 financial crisis, our results clearly show 
that credit shortage has been a key factor pushing SMEs to reduce their workforce at the 
extensive margin, and in particular to rely on individual layoffs, early retirement schemes and 
reduction of temporary employment. However, estimates also show that credit-constrained 
SMEs have been significantly more likely to adjust employment at the intensive margin, 
especially  through  the  use  of  temporary  layoff  allowances,  than  their  non-constrained  
counterparts. This outcome is quite interesting as it suggests that temporary layoff schemes 
have played a significant role in mitigating the employment effects of the financial crisis in 
Belgium.  Put  differently,  it  adds  to  a  growing  literature  indicating  that  short-time  
compensation, i.e. pro-rated unemployment benefits for workers whose hours are reduced for 
economic reasons, may effectively contribute to save jobs during recessions (Abraham and 
Houseman, 2014; Hurley, 2010). 
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Table 1: Firm-level descriptive statistics, sample associated to LPM and probit 
regressions 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Type of adjustment measure:   
Labour input reduction a 0.33 0.47 
Extensive margin: 0.31 0.46 
Collective layoffs 0.01 0.12 
Individual layoffs 0.28 0.45 
Temporary employment adjustment 0.17 0.38 
Early retirement 0.08 0.27 
Intensive margin: 
Temporary layoffs (for economic reasons) 
0.21 
0.17 
0.41 
0.38 
Reduction of working hours (subsidised or not) 0.08 0.27 
Type of credit constraint:   
Decreased access  0.25 0.43 
Quantitative constraint: 
To finance working capital 
To finance new investment  
To refinance debt  
0.27 
0.16 
0.22 
0.16 
0.44 
0.37 
0.42 
0.37 
Cost constraint: 
To finance working capital  
To finance new investment  
To refinance debt  
0.23 
0.15 
0.19 
0.12 
0.42 
0.36 
0.40 
0.33 
Firm characteristics:   
Share of workers with tenure d 5 years 0.37 0.25 
Share of high-skilled workers 0.43 0.33 
Firm age (years) 35.7 24.8 
Firm size (total number of employees) 35.2 122.0 
Industry: 
Manufacturing 
 
0.16 
 
Construction 0.14  
Trade 0.29  
Business activities 0.37  
Financial intermediation 0.03  
Decrease in demand for firm’s products/services 0.52 0.50 
Strong competitive pressure for firm’s main 
product/service 
 
0.81 
 
0.39 
Number of observations b 855 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. b Except for ‘Decreased access’ 
and ‘Cost constraint’ variables for which the number of observations is respectively equal to 844 and 854. 
Weighted descriptive statistics. 
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Table 2: The impact of credit constraints on labour input reduction a, LPM estimates 
and marginal effects from probit regressions 
 LPM Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of credit constraint b:     
Decreased access 0.083** 
(0.037) 
 0.081** 
(0.005) 
 
Quantitative constraint  0.099*** 
(0.034) 
 0.100*** 
(0.005) 
Covariates:     
Firm age (in years) 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Firm size (total number of 
employees) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Industry:      
Manufacturing Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Construction -0.109** 
(0.055) 
-0.112** 
(0.055) 
-0.106*** 
(0.007) 
-0.115*** 
(0.007) 
Trade -0.066 
(0.047) 
-0.064 
(0.047) 
-0.079*** 
(0.006) 
-0.075*** 
(0.006) 
Business services -0.138*** 
(0.048) 
-0.113** 
(0.047) 
-0.146*** 
(0.006) 
-0.119*** 
(0.006) 
Financial intermediation 0.008 
(0.098) 
-0.010 
(0.095) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Decrease of demand for 
firm’s products/services  
0.291*** 
(0.033) 
0.314*** 
(0.031) 
0.300*** 
(0.004) 
0.320*** 
(0.004) 
Strong competitive pressure 
for firm’s main 
product/service  
0.122*** 
(0.041) 
0.099** 
(0.040) 
0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.134*** 
(0.005) 
Share of workers with tenure 
 5 years 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Share of high-skilled workers -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.16 0.16   
Pseudo R-squared   0.13 0.13 
Number of observations 844 855 844 855 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. b Main explanatory variables are 
dummies taking the value 1 if the firm between 2010 and 2013 respectively : i) experienced a moderate or strong 
decrease in access to external financing through the usual financial channels (Decreased Access), and ii) faced a 
‘quantitative’ credit constraint, i.e. that credit was not available (Quantitative constraint). Weighted regressions. 
Robust standard errors reported between parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: The impact of credit constraints on labour input reduction a, 2SLS estimates 
and marginal effects from bivariate probit regressions b 
 2SLS Bivariate probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of credit constraint c:     
Decreased access 0.683*** 
(0.258) 
 0.409*** 
(0.042) 
 
Quantitative constraint  0.411*** 
(0.112) 
 0.372*** 
(0.006) 
Covariates d: YES YES YES YES 
Weak identification test e 10.9 10.2   
Overidentification test f 0.50 0.34   
Endogeneity test g 0.03 0.09   
Wald test F², p-value   0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.24 0.37   
Number of observations 532 537 537 537 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. b Instruments for the 2SLS and 
bivariate probit regressions include (in addition to covariates contained in the vector Xi of equation (1)) the 
change in firm’s main bank loan supply (in columns (1) to (4)); a dummy indicating whether the firm’s main 
bank is of foreign origin, i.e. a branch or a subsidiary of a foreign bank (in columns (1) and (3)); the number of 
banks to which the firm has borrowed money during 2010-2013 (in columns (1) and (3)); a dummy for the firm’s 
main bank (in columns (2) and (4)); the firm’s risk of default in 2012 and 2013 (in columns (2) and (4)); the 
cross-product of the firm’s risk of default in 2012 and 2013 (in columns (2) and (4)); and a dummy for multi-
establishment firms (in columns (2) and (4)). c Main explanatory variables are dummies taking the value 1 if the 
firm between 2010 and 2013 respectively : i) experienced a moderate or strong decrease in access to external 
financing through the usual financial channels (Decreased Access), and ii) faced a ‘quantitative’ credit 
constraint, i.e. that credit was not available (Quantitative constraint). d Covariates include the size and age of the 
firm, sectoral affiliation (4 dummies), change in demand for firm’s products/services (1 dummy), competitive 
pressure for firm’s main product/service (1 dummy), share of workers with at most 5 years of tenure, and share 
of high skilled workers. e Weak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. f 
Overidentification test reports p-value of Hansen J statistic. g Endogeneity test shows probability that 
endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. Weighted regressions. Robust standard errors 
reported between parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: The impact of cost credit constraints on labour input reduction a, LPM and 
2SLS estimates and marginal effects from probit and bivariate probit regressions 
 LPM  2SLSb Probit Bivariate 
probitb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of credit constraint c:     
Cost constraint 0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.061 
(0.130) 
0.013 
(0.059) 
-0.209 
(0.134) 
Covariates d: YES YES YES YES 
Weak identification test e  11.2   
Overidentification test f  0.10   
Endogeneity test g  0.32   
Wald test F², p-value    0.10 
R-squared 0.15 0.44   
Pseudo R-squared   0.15  
Number of observations 854 538 854 538 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. b Instruments for the 2SLS and 
bivariate probit regressions include (in addition to covariates contained in the vector Xi of equation (1)) the 
change in firm’s main bank loan supply, the firm’s risk of default in 2012, the average firm’s risk of default in 
2012-2013, the cross-product of the firm’s risk of default in 2012 and 2013, and a dummy for multi-
establishment firms. c The main explanatory variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm between 2010 and 
2013 faced a ‘quantitative constraint’, i.e. credit was available but the conditions (interest rate and other 
contractual terms) were too onerous, and 0 otherwise. d Covariates include the size and age of the firm, sectoral 
affiliation (4 dummies), change in demand for firm’s products/services (1 dummy), competitive pressure for 
firm’s main product/service (1 dummy), share of workers with at most 5 years of tenure, and share of high 
skilled workers. e Weak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. f Overidentification test 
reports p-value of Hansen J statistic. g Endogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can 
actually be treated as exogenous. Weighted regressions. Robust standard errors reported between parentheses. 
***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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 m
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s-
pr
od
uc
t o
f t
he
 fi
rm
’s
 ri
sk
 o
f d
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 d
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s b
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s b
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 d
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w
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 d
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 c
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 c
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ai
nt
 , 
i.e
. t
ha
t c
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ia
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in
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fir
m
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tio
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 d
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, c
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n 
pr
od
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er
vi
ce
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 d
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f w
or
ke
rs
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t 5
 y
ea
rs
 o
f t
en
ur
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of
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ed
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at
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 re
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 rk
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at
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 p
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 c
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s. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
, 5
 a
nd
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t l
ev
el
s, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
30
 
 T
ab
le
 7
: 
T
he
 i
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
cr
ed
it 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s 
on
 l
ab
ou
r 
in
pu
t 
re
du
ct
io
na
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
on
 f
ir
m
’s
 m
ai
n 
pr
od
uc
t/s
er
vi
ce
 m
ar
ke
t, 
LP
M
 a
nd
 2
SL
Sb
 e
st
im
at
es
 
 
(1
) 
(1
’)
 
(2
) 
(2
’)
 
(3
) 
(3
’)
 
(4
) 
(4
’)
 
 
St
ro
ng
 
co
m
pe
tit
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 c
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 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 fi
rm
’s
 m
ai
n 
ba
nk
 lo
an
 s
up
pl
y 
(in
 M
od
el
s 
(1
’)
 to
 (4
’)
); 
du
m
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
fir
m
’s
 m
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f d
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 m
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 c
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 m
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pe
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 d
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pe
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 c
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 c
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t c
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 o
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 d
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 o
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at
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ep
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 rk
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at
io
n 
te
st
 re
po
rts
 p
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s c
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re
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s r
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at
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f t
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 c
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 c
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 m
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 d
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 f
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f d
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 m
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f d
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 d
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 d
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 c
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 c
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t c
on
st
ra
in
t, 
i.e
. t
ha
t c
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Appendix 1: Firm-level descriptive statistics, sample associated to 2SLS and bivariate  
probit regressions 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Type of adjustment measure:   
Labour input reduction a 0.31 0.46 
Extensive margin: 0.29 0.45 
Collective layoffs 0.02 0.13 
Individual layoffs 0.26 0.44 
Temporary employment adjustment 0.17 0.38 
Early retirement 0.05 0.21 
Intensive margin: 
Temporary layoffs (for economic reasons) 
0.22 
0.20 
0.42 
0.40 
Reduction of working hours (subsidised or not) 0.08 0.27 
Type credit constraint:   
Decreased access  0.28 0.45 
Quantitative constraint: 
To finance working capital 
To finance new investment  
To refinance debt  
0.33 
0.24 
0.29 
0.19 
0.47 
0.42 
0.45 
0.39 
Cost constraint: 
To finance working capital  
To finance new investment  
To refinance debt  
0.31 
0.20 
0.25 
0.16 
0.46 
0.40 
0.44 
0.37 
Firm characteristics:   
Share of workers with tenure d 5 years 0.37 0.25 
Share of high-skilled workers 0.45 0.32 
Firm age (years) 36.1 22.8 
Firm size (total number of employees) 30.4 135.3 
Industry: 
Manufacturing 
 
0.20 
 
0.40 
Construction 0.18 0.38 
Trade 0.27 0.45 
Business activities 0.35 0.48 
Financial intermediation 0.00 0.00 
Decrease in demand for firm’s products/services 0.52 0.50 
Strong competitive pressure for firm’s main 
product/service 
0.79 0.41 
Number of observations a 538 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm needed to significantly reduce its 
labour input or alter its composition between 2010 and 2013, and 0 otherwise. b Except for ‘Decreased access’, 
‘Quantitative constraint to finance new investment’, ‘Quantitative constraint to refinance debt’, ‘Cost 
constraint to finance working capital’, ‘Cost constraint to new investment’, ‘Cost constraint to refinance debt’ 
variables for which the number of observations is respectively equal to 532, 537, 534, 536, 536 and 534. 
Weighted descriptive statistics. 
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Appendix 2: Firm-level descriptive statistics for main instruments, sample associated 
to 2SLS and bivariate probit regressions 
Variables Mean St. Dev. 
% change in firm’s main bank loan supply before 
(October 2005 – June 2007) and after (October 2008 
– June 2011) the crisis a 
2.07 0.54 
Firm’s main bank of foreign origin, i.e. branch  
or subsidiary of a foreign bank (Yes) 
0.04 0.20 
Number of banks to which the firm has borrowed  
money between 2010 and 2013 
2.30 1.08 
Firm’s main bank dummies   
Bank 1 0.000 0.022 
Bank 2 0.010 0.101 
Bank 3 0.001 0.035 
Bank 4 0.024 0.152 
Bank 5 0.029 0.168 
Bank 6 0.007 0.084 
Bank 7 0.016 0.127 
Bank 8 0.002 0.040 
Bank 9 0.012 0.107 
Bank 10 0.007 0.085 
Bank 11 0.000 0.014 
Bank 12 0.009 0.095 
Bank 13 0.246 0.431 
Bank 14 0.218 0.413 
Bank 15 0.418 0.494 
Firm’s risk of default accessed by the firm’s main  
bank in 2012 
1.81 8.76 
Firm’s risk of default accessed by the firm’s main  
bank in 2013 
2.76 10.71 
Multi-establishment firm (Yes) 0.14 0.35 
Number of observations b 538 
Notes: a The exact definition of this variable is as follows: % change in the number of loans made by the firm’s 
i main bank to all  borrowers other than firm i before (i.e. October 2005 – June 2007) and after (i.e. October 
2008 – June 2011) the crisis, normalized by the number of loans made by the firm’s i main bank before the 
crisis. b Except for ‘Firm’s main bank of foreign origin’ variable for which the number of observations is 
respectively equal to 536. Weighted descriptive statistics. 
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Appendix 3: Determinants of credit constraints, LPM estimates, i.e. first-stage 
of 2SLS regression estimates for labour input reduction 
Dependent variable a: Decreased 
Access 
Quantitative 
Constraint 
 (1) (2) 
Instrumental variables:   
% change in firm’s main bank loan supply before 
(October 2005 – June 2007) and after (October 
2008 – June 2011) the crisis b 
-0.096* 
(0.059) 
-0.123** 
(0.061) 
Firm’s main bank of foreign origin, i.e. branch or 
subsidiary of foreign bank (Yes) 
-0.061 
(0.055) 
 
Number of banks to which the firm has borrowed 
money between 2010 and 2013 
0.012 
(0.027) 
 
Firm’s main bank dummies:   
Bank 1  -0.724*** 
(0.148) 
Bank 2  -0.385*** 
(0.120) 
Bank 3  -0.412*** 
(0.081) 
Bank 4  -0.238** 
(0.098) 
Bank 5  0.061 
(0.294) 
Bank 6  -0.379*** 
(0.101) 
Bank 7  0.425 
(0.359) 
Bank 8  -0.247 
(0.169) 
Bank 9  -0.191 
(0.179) 
Bank 10  -0.209 
(0.341) 
Bank 11  -0.447*** 
(0.105) 
Bank 12  -0.043 
(0.235) 
Bank 13  -0.065 
(0.081) 
Bank 14  0.004 
(0.093) 
Firm’s risk of default in 2012 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
Firm’s risk of default in 2013 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Cross-product of firm’s risk of default in 2012  
and 2013 
 -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Multi-establishment firm (Yes) 0.010 
(0.082) 
 
Other covariates c: YES YES 
Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) multivariate F-test of 
excluded instruments d 
 
10.86*** 
 
10.24*** 
Number of observations 532 537 
Notes: a The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm between 2010 and 2013: i) experienced a moderate or 
strong decrease in access to external financing through the usual financial channels (Decreased Access), and ii) faced a 
‘quantitative’ credit constraint, i.e. that credit was not available (Quantitative constraint).  b The exact definition of this variable 
is as follows: % change in the number of loans made by the firm’s i main bank to all  borrowers other than firm i before (i.e. 
October 2005 – June 2007) and after (i.e. October 2008 – June 2011) the crisis, normalized by the number of loans made by the 
firm’s i main bank before the crisis. c Regressions also control for firm age and size, sectoral affiliation (4 dummies), change in 
demand for firm’s products/services (1 dummy), competitive pressure for firm’s main product/service (1 dummy), share of 
workers with at most 5 years of tenure, and share of high skilled workers. d Given that there is a single endogeneous regressor 
(i.e. the credit constraint), the SW statistic is identical to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic for weak identification (as the 
robust option has been requested in Stata). Robust standard errors reported between parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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